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I.

INTRODUCTION

In late November 2018, President Trump criticized District
Judge Jon S. Tigar of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit,1 over the Obama-appointed judge's ruling that fed-
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1. Robert Barnes, Rebuking Trump's Criticism of 'Obama Judge,' Chief Justice Roberts
Defends Judiciaryas Independent',WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2018, 6:21 PM), https://www.wash-
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eral law clearly mandates that migrants may seek asylum anywhere on United States soil.2 This ruling was in direct opposition
to the Trump Administration's attempt to deny asylum to migrants
who illegally crossed the border. 3 However, the President's statements were not left unanswered. In a rare rebuke, Chief Justice
John Roberts of the United States Supreme Court, appointed by
President George W. Bush, departed from the stoic tradition of the
Court, and responded to the President's statements. 4 The Chief
Justice defended Tigar and the judiciary as a whole, stating:
We do not have Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush judges
or Clinton judges .... What we have is an extraordinary group
of dedicated judges doing their level best to do equal right to
those appearing before them.... That independent judiciary is
5
something we should all be thankful for.
The President quickly responded via Twitter: "Sorry Chief Justice Roberts, but you do indeed have 'Obama judges,' and they have
a much different point of view than the people who are charged with
the safety of our country."6 Regardless of which side of the aisle one
stands on, there seems to be some truth behind both opinions. 7 The
women and men who don the black robes in front of hundreds of
court rooms across the United States every day are extraordinary
individuals out to do their very best to interpret and apply the law
how each see fit. Nonetheless, most still agree with the President's
criticism that, truly, there are "Obama judges," that is, judges who
ingtonpost.com/politics/rebuking-trumps-criticism-of-obama-judge-chief-justice-roberts-defends-judiciary-as-independent/2018/11/21/6383c7b2-edb7-1 1e8-96d4Od23f2aaadO9_story.html?noredirect-on&utm term-.7ddba56aO4 ld.
2. Id.
3. Id. The district court judge wrote that, "[w]hatever the scope of the President's authority, he may not rewrite the immigration laws to impose a condition that Congress has
expressly forbidden." Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. The President continued:
It would be great if the 9th Circuit was indeed an "independent judiciary," but if it is
why... are so many opposing view (on Border and Safety) cases filed there, and why
are a vast number of those cases overturned. Please study the numbers, they are
shocking. We need protection and security-these rulings are making our country unsafe! Very dangerous and unwise!
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 21, 2018, 12:51 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1065346909362 143232;
Donald
J.
Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 21, 2018, 1:09 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1065351478347530241.
7. See generally Jake J. Smith, Supreme Court Justices Become Less ImpartialandMore
Ideological When Casting the Swing Vote, KELLOGGINSIGHT (Sept. 13, 2018), https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/supreme-court-justices-become-less-impartial-andmore-ideological-when-casting-the-swing-vote.
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are partisan and aligned with the ideological principles of the President who appointed them. 8 Recently, this seemingly obvious criticism has intensified in the First Amendment realm.
The liberal-conservative divide has a long history in First Amendment jurisprudence. Initially, the Left 9 "embraced a 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."' 10 This view aimed
to broaden the First Amendment's protections in order to promote
the right of dissenting speech for everyone.
On the other hand,
the Right sought to apply free speech protections narrowly, believing it should only protect speech that is explicitly political. 12 This
view changed over time as "conservatives recognized the importance from their perspective of affording strong free speech
13
rights to business interests."
This changing understanding of free speech has manifested in the
decisions of the judiciary. In fact, the conservative majority on the
Court "has narrowed [First Amendment] liberties except when it

8. See id.
9. This article's reference to the "Left" refers to the left-wing ideologies centered around
individuals with liberal beliefs, favoring an expanded role in government. Conversely, the
"Right" refers to the right-wing ideologies centered around individuals with conservative beliefs, favoring individual rights and civil liberties.
10. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 5 (2016) (citation
omitted).
11. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) ("The constitutional right of free
expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed
and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting
the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us .... )'; Red

Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the First Amendment
to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather
than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself
or a private licensee.").
12. Adam Liptak, How Conservatives Weaponized the First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES
(June 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/30/us/politics/first-amendment-conservatives-supreme-court.html; see, e.g., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986)
("[W]e have never suggested that the First Amendment compels the Government to ensure
that adult theaters, or any other kinds of speech-related businesses for that matter, will be
able to obtain sites at bargain prices." (citing Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,
78 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("The inquiry for First Amendment purposes is not concerned with economic impact ..... ))); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 783-84 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The Court speaks of the
importance in a 'predominantly free enterprise economy' of intelligent and well-informed decisions as to allocation of resources. While there is again much to be said for the Court's
observation as a matter of desirable public policy, there iscertainly nothing in the United
States Constitution which requires the Virginia Legislature to hew to the teachings of Adam
Smith in its legislative decisions regulating the pharmacy profession.") (citations omitted).
13.

SHIFFRIN, supra note 10, at 6.
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serves the conservative ideological agenda to do otherwise." 14 Ultimately, over the past decade the conservative majority has used the
First Amendment as a weapon-an outcome-oriented tool-used to
15
achieve certain ideological agendas.
The United States Supreme Court's recent decision of Janus v.
AFSCME, Council 31,16 for example, has emphasized this issue. In
Janus, the Court overruled Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, an
over forty-year-old precedent, holding, in a five to four decision, that
union "fair-share" fees are unconstitutional on First Amendment
grounds. 17 This decision comes at the end of a lengthy campaignbacked by wealthy conservative legal foundations-18 -to reverse
Abood, 19 and has been widely criticized as an ideological attack on
labor unions. 20 The four-member dissent, authored by Justice
Elena Kagan and joined by the Court's three remaining liberal
members, criticized the five-member majority opinion, authored by
Justice Samuel Alito and joined by the Court's four remaining conservative members, stating that the conservative majority effec21
tively "weaponize led] the First Amendment."

14.

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION

194

(2010); see, e.g., Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2491 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, [the majority's] reversal today creates a significant anomaly-an exception, applying to union fees alone, from the usual rules governing public employees' speech.");
Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2383 (2018) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("[R]ather than set forth broad, new, First Amendment principles, [as the majority does,] I believe that we should focus more directly upon precedent more closely related to
the case at hand."); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (expanding the free speech
rights of corporations); Gareetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (denying free speech rights
to public sector employees).
15. This article takes a more expansive view than what has been termed "First Amendment Lochnerism," i.e.,
"using the First Amendment as a workaround to bring back Lochner's
economic deregulation," focusing on the broader argument that the First Amendment has
become a political tool. Boyd Garriott, Janus and the Problem with Alleging Lochnerism,
ONLABOR (May 4, 2018), https://onlabor.org/janus-and-the-problem-with-alleging-lochnerism/; see also Kenneth D. Katkin, FirstAmendment Lochnerism?Emerging Constitutional
Limitations on Government Regulation of Non- Speech Economic Activity, 33 N. KY. L. REV.
365 (2006) (explaining briefly First Amendment Lochnerism).
16. 138 S.Ct. 2448 (2018).
17. Id. at 2486.
18. Celine McNicholas et al., Janus and Fair Share Fees: The OrganizationsFinancing
the Attack on Unions' Ability to Represent Workers, ECON. POL'Y INST. (Feb. 21, 2018),
https://www.epi.org/publication/j anus-and-fair-share-fees-the-organizations-financing-theattack-on-unions-ability-to-represent-workers/.
19. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers
Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 2933 (2015); Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014); Knox v. SEIU, Local
1000, 567 U.S. 298 (2012)).
20. See generally Fran Spielman et al., Chicago Teachers Union Uses Janus Case to Blast
Rauner, Emanuel, CHI. SUN TIMES (June 7, 2018, 10:36 AM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/
news/chicago-teachers-union-uses-j anus-case-to-blast-rauner-emanuel/.
21. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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This article analyzes the conservative majority's recent trend to
exploit free speech as an outcome-oriented tool to promote certain
ideologies. It utilizes the Court's decision in Janus to evidence this
"weaponization" of the First Amendment and shed light on exactly
what Justice Kagan condemns in her dissenting opinion. Finally,
the article concludes by analyzing the potential implication of the
conservative majority's weaponization of free speech, discussing potential challenges to state minimum wage laws.

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

HistoricalBackground of the Conservative Free Speech Movement
1.

Early Years of Conservative Free Speech Ideology

Since Roe v. Wade, 22 "the Supreme Court has rarely recognized
new constitutional rights or extended existing rights; in fact, it often has significantly cut back on important civil liberties." 23 The
Burger, 24 Rehnquist, 25 and Roberts 26 Courts generally have recognized new rights only when such rights advance conservative ideology. 27 This general trend persists in the context of the First Amend29
ment. 28 Case law throughout the years since Chief Justice Warren
22. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
23. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 169.
24. In 1969, President Richard Nixon appointed Warren E. Burger as the Chief Justice
of the United States Supreme Court due to his "starkly conservative stance" on Fifth Amendment Rights of the accused and his connections to the Republican party. Warren E. Burger,
OYEZ, www.oyez.org/justices/warren-e-burger (last visited Feb. 3, 2019). President Nixon
hoped that Chief Justice Burger's "deference to 'law and order' would reign in what many
conservatives saw as liberal judicial activism." Id.
25. In 1969, President Nixon appointed William H. Rehnquist to the United States Supreme Court as an associate justice, in which he served for seventeen years, "stay[ing] true
to his conservative values."
William H. Rehnquist, OYEZ, www.oyez.org/justices/william h rehnquist (last visited Feb. 4, 2019). Then in 1986, President Ronald Reagan appointed Rehnquist to the position of Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court upon
former Chief Justice Burger's retirement. Id.
26. In 2005, President George W. Bush Nominated John G. Roberts as an associate justice to fill Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's vacancy. John G. Roberts, OYEZ, www.oyez.org/justices/john-g-roberts-jr (last visited Feb. 3, 2019). However, after the death of Justice
Rehnquist, President Bush withdrew his initial nomination to instead nominate Roberts to
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Id. Chief Justice Roberts, known for
being a political pragmatist on the bench, is an avid supporter of the Court's role as an independent judiciary: to interpret the law, rather than create it. Id.
27. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 129.
28. Id. at 194.
29. In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower nominated Earl Warren to be the Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Earl Warren, OYEZ, www.oyez.org/justices/
earl warren (last visited Feb. 3, 2019). Chief Justice Warren "joined the Court in the midst
of some of its most important issues-racial segregation in public schools and the expansion
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left the bench in 1969 helps illustrate the Court's conservative ap30
proach to free speech.
Beginning in 1971, Robert H. Bork, a future United States Supreme Court nominee and prominent conservative law professor at
the time, wrote that "[c]onstitutional protection should be accorded
only to speech that is explicitly political," and that "[t]here is no
basis for judicial intervention to protect any other form of expression, be it scientific, literary or that variety of expression we call
obscene or pornographic." 31 Bork's view is a clear rejection of the
free speech claims presented to the Warren Court in the 1950s and
1960s, which involved anti-obscenity, civil rights, and public protests claims. 32 At this time, it was the Left who led the conversation
on supporting broad First Amendment protections for all, such as
"fighting to protect sexually explicit materials from government
censorship" 33 and even supporting "the right of the American Nazi
Party to march among Holocaust survivors." 34 This is quite the op35
posite of what is seen today on both the Left and Right.
This change is first noticeable five years after the publication of
Bork's conservative stance on free speech. In Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,3 the Court
considered "a challenge to a state law that banned advertising the
prices of prescription drugs." 37 The claim, filed by Public Citizen, a
consumer rights group founded by Ralph Nader, 38 attacked the
39
state law as violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Persuaded by the consumer advocates' argument that the law hurt
consumers, the Court held that "[t]he First Amendment protects
of civil liberties." Id. "Growing liberal with age, much of Warren's decisions were still rooted
in Progressive beliefs supported by the rule of common law." Id.
30. See, e.g., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacyv. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 783-84 (1975).
31. Liptak, supra note 12.
32. Id. See generally Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563 (1968); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957).
33. Liptak, supra note 12; see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
34. Liptak, supra note 12; see also Nat'l Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
35. Liptak, supra note 12 (quoting Floyd Abrams, a lawyer specializing in the First
Amendment) ("Now the progressive community is at least skeptical and sometimes distraught at the level of First Amendment protection which is being afforded in cases brought
by litigants on the right.").
36. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
37. Liptak, supra note 12.
38. Ralph Nader is a well-known consumer activist and environmentalist. Beth Rowen,
Ralph Nader: Consumer Advocate and PresidentialHopeful, INFOPLEASE, https://www.infoplease.com/ralph-nader (last updated Feb. 28, 2017). Nader, along with his followers, advocate for "protections for workers, taxpayers, and the environment and [fight] to stem the
power of large corporations." Id.
39. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 749-50.

414

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 58

the advertisement because of the 'information of potential interest
and value' conveyed, rather than because of any direct contribution
to the interchange of ideas." 40 While this decision seemed to be a
win for consumers, it soon became one of "the biggest boomerangs
41
in judicial cases ever."
Subsequent rulings made clear the true beneficiary of Virginia
Citizens: corporate speakers. 42 The Court was soon flooded with
corporate speech cases claiming First Amendment challenges to the
inclusion of alcohol content on beer can labels, the limitation of outdoor tobacco advertising near schools, rules governing how compounded drugs may be advertised, gun control laws, securities regulations, country-of-origin labels, graphic cigarette warnings, and
limits on off-label drug marketing. 43 Indeed, corporate speakers ef44
fectively used the First Amendment to achieve their own agendas.
This trend continues today and, in fact, is even more pronounced
45
under the Roberts Court.
2.

Conservative Free Speech Intensifies Under the Roberts
Court

According to a study prepared for the New York Times, 4 the
United States Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Roberts, has
heard a larger share of First Amendment cases concerning conservative speech than its predecessors, ruling in favor of conservative speech at a considerably higher rate than liberal speech. 47 Indeed, "'[t]he Roberts Court-more than any modern court-has
trained its sights on speech promoting conservative values,' the
study found."48 A few noteworthy cases illustrate these findings.
40. Id. at 780 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 820 (1975)). Notably, the sole
dissent in the decision came from the Court's most conservative member at the time- future
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist. Id. at 790 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I do not believe
that the First Amendment mandates the Court's 'open door policy' toward such commercial
advertising.").
41. Liptak, supra note 12.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. ("[T]he study ... was conducted by Lee Epstein, a law professor and political
scientist at Washington University in St. Louis; Andrew D. Martin, a political scientist at
the University of Michigan and the dean of its College of Literature, Science and the Arts;
and Kevin Quinn, a political scientist at the University of Michigan.").
47. Id.
48. Id. Contrast these results with those of the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts.
The Warren Court, from 1953 to 1969, "was almost exclusively concerned with cases concerning liberal speech. Of its 60 free-expression cases, only five, or about 8 percent, challenged
the suppression of conservative speech." Id. The Burger Court, from 1969 to 1986, saw a
rise in the proportion of challenges to restrictions on conservative speech to 22%, with a win
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On May 30, 2006, the Court decided "whether the First Amendment protects a government employee from discipline based on
speech made pursuant to the employee's official duties[J" in Garcetti v. Ceballos.49 Ultimately, the Court rejected "the notion that
the First Amendment shields from discipline the expressions employees make pursuant to their professional duties." 50 However, the
true implications of the case encompassed far more than ordinary
speech made pursuant to the employee's official duties. Rather, the
Court was protecting the Government's retaliatory conduct against
Ceballos51
The case involved Richard Ceballos, a long-time deputy district
52
attorney for the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office,
who challenged the veracity of a deputy sheriff in regard to an affidavit he signed to obtain a search warrant. 53 Ceballos contacted
the officer to discuss inaccuracies he found. 54 Unsatisfied with the
officer's answers, Ceballos filed a memo with his superiors expressing his concerns and recommending dismissal of the case. 55 His superiors decided to continue with the case pending the disposition of
the defendant's motion to traverse the evidence, in which Ceballos
himself was called as a witness for the defense. 5 Ultimately, Ceballos faced retaliation for his conduct 57-conduct which is arguably
58
seen as being a whistleblower.
Ceballos sued, alleging that the "petitioners violated the First..
AmendmentH by retaliating against him based on his memo" because the memo constituted protected speech. 59 "Although the Supreme Court long has held that there is constitutional protection
for the speech of government employees, it ruled against Ceballos
and concluded that he could not bring a claim for the violation of

rate of 70% for conservative speech and 47% for liberal speech. Id. Additionally, the
Rehnquist Court, from 1986 to 2005, saw a rise in the proportion of challenges to restrictions
on conservative speech to 42%, with a win rate of 63% for conservative speech and 48% for
liberal speech. Id.
49. 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006).
50. Id. at 426.
51. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 196.
52. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413.
53. Id. at 413-14.
54. Id. at 414.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 414-15.
57. Id. at 415.
58. See id. at 428-29 (Souter, J., dissenting); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 196.
59. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415 (majority opinion).
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his First Amendment rights."6 30 The majority chose to narrowly tailor First Amendment principles, drawing a distinction between
speech made "as a citizen" and speech made "as a public employee."6 31 Under the Court's view, "[r]estricting speech that owes
its existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities
does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as
a private citizen."6 32 Accordingly, speech is largely unprotected
when it is made pursuant to a public employee's employment duties. 3 Because this unprecedented distinction only protected
4
speech made as a private citizen, Ceballos's claims were nullified.
Similarly, on January 21, 2010, the Court overruled precedent it
had recently decided to instead favor corporate speech in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission. 5 In Citizens United, the
Court was asked to reconsider Austin v. Michigan Chamberof Commerce,6 6 a 1990 decision, and, in effect, McConnell v. FederalElection Commission, 7 a 2003 decision. 8 Ultimately, the Court overruled Austin and McConnell, holding that "corporations have the
First Amendment right to spend money in election campaigns."6 9
The case concerned Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation that
released a film depicting then presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.7 0 While the film Hillary: The Movie 7 was released in theaters
and on DVD, Citizens United sought to increase distribution and
make the film available through video-on-demand.' 2 Citizens
United wanted to advertise the free offering through broadcast and
cable television.7 3 However, "federal law prohibited ... corporations
and unions from using general treasury funds to make direct contributions to candidates or independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, through any

60. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 195. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the
Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Garcetti, 547
U.S. at 413.
61.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 195.

62.
63.

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-22.
Id.

64.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 195.

65.
66.
67.
68.

558 U.S.
494 U.S.
540 U.S.
Citizens

69.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 197.

70.

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319.

71.

HILARY: THE MOVIE (Citizens United 2008).

72.
73.

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 320.
Id.

310 (2010).
652 (1990).
93 (2003).
United, 558 U.S. at 319.
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form of media, in connection with certain qualified federal elections." 74 Fearing the film and its advertisements would be barred
by the federal ban, Citizens United filed for injunctive relief, claim75
ing the law was unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
The question to overrule Austin and McConnell sparked a multitude of opinions among the Justices, 7 but ultimately, the majority
expanded free speech rights, striking down the regulatory restrictions. 77 The Court rationalized that more speech is better for
the public good in response to the arguments proffered for upholding the restrictions by Citizens United's opponents, such as the prevention of corporate corruption. 78 Thus, the Court chose to protect
corporate speech and a corporation's ability to spend money in elec79
tion campaigns.
Lastly, on June 26, 2018, the day prior to its ruling in Janus, the

Court decided National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v.

Becerra.80 In Becerra, the Court determined whether a California
law requiring licensed and unlicensed perinatal care clinics to notify pregnant mothers of "free or low-cost services, including abortions," and to provide contact information for such services, violated
the First Amendment. 8 1 The FACT Act's stated purpose sought to
promote California residents' knowledge of their personal reproductive health care and address the issue of licensed and unlicensed
82
crisis pregnancy centers run by organizations opposed to abortion.
The petitioners, one such organization, filed suit after the Governor
83
of California signed the FACT Act into law.

74. Id.
75. Id. at 321.
76. See id. at 317 ("Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C.J., and Scalia and Alito, JJ., joined, in which Thomas, J., joined as to all but Part IV, and
in which Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined as to Part IV. Roberts, C.J.,
filed a concurring opinion, in which Alito, J., joined; Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in
which Alito, J., joined, and in which Thomas, J., joined in part. Stevens, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ.,
joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.").
77. Id. at 365.
78. Steven Andre, Government Election Advocacy: Implications of Recent Supreme Court
Analysis, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 835, 842 (2012).
79.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 197.

80. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
81. Id. at 2368 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123470 (West, Westlaw through
2019 Reg. Sess.)) ("The California State Legislature enacted the FACT Act to regulate crisis
pregnancy centers. Crisis pregnancy centers ... are 'pro-ih... organizations that offer a
limited range of free pregnancy options, counseling, and other services to individuals that
visit a center.").
82. Id. at 2369-70.
83. Id. at 2370.
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The majority, 84 authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, 85 struck
down the law's notice requirements, holding that the law violated
the First Amendment. 86 In regard to the licensed facilities, the majority refused to recognize a new category for "professional speech,"
because doing so would "exempt [it] from ordinary First Amendment principles." 87 While the majority recognized that the Court
had granted this type of speech lesser protections in two situations, 88 it did not view the California law to fit within those situations. 89 Further, the majority did not view the law to achieve its
stated purpose of promoting health care knowledge; thus, it concluded the law could not even meet the lesser standard of intermediate scrutiny. 90
In regard to the unlicensed facilities, the majority cited precedent
which required "disclosures to remedy a harm that is 'potentially
real not purely hypothetical' and to extend 'no broader than reasonably necessary."' 91 However, the majority opined that California
had not "demonstrated any justification ... that [was] more than
Ipurely hypothetical."' 92 Even if it had, the majority concluded that
the law nonetheless burdened speech because the "disclosure requirement [was] wholly disconnected from California's informa93
tional interest."
For all of these reasons, the majority believed that the petitioners
were likely to succeed on the merits and reversed and remanded the
95
case back to the lower court. 94 In dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer
84. Id. at 2367 (joining the majority opinion were Roberts, C.J., and Kennedy, Alito, and
Gorsuch, JJ.).
85. In 1991, Clarence Thomas, "known for his quiet, stoic demeanor during oral arguments and his conservative viewpoint that challenges, if not surpasses, even Scalia's originalism," was appointed by Republican President George H. W. Bush. Clarence Thomas, Oyez,
https://www.oyez.org/justices/clarence-thomas (last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
86. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2378.
87. Id. at 2375.
88. First, the Court's precedent has "applied more deferential review to some laws that
require professionals to disclose factual, noncontroversial information in their 'commercial
speech." Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Second, the Court's precedents
have permitted states to "regulate professional conduct, even though that conduct incidentally involves speech." Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
884 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)).
89. Id. at 2372.
90. Id. at 2375.
91. Id. at 2377 (citations omitted).
92. Id. (citations omitted).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2378.
95. In 1994, Democratic President Bill Clinton appointed Stephen G. Breyer to the
United States Supreme Court, who since "has cultivated a reputation for pragmatism, optimism, and cooperation with both political parties." Stephen G. Breyer, OYEz, https://
www.oyez.org/justices/stephen-g-breyer (last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
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viewed the majority's analysis as "a misuse of First Amendment
principles." 9 Specifically, Justice Breyer stated that "[u]sing the
First Amendment to strike down economic and social laws that legislatures long would have thought themselves free to enact will, for
the American public, obscure, not clarify, the true value of protecting freedom of speech." 97 Indeed, Justice Breyer's concern for this
misuse of First Amendment principles directly relates to Justice
98
Kagan's future remarks of weaponizing the First Amendment.
B.

The Janus Decision

On June 27, 2018, this increasingly conservative trend culminated in the Court's decision of Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31.99
From the very start, the case was viewed as an effort to thwart Illinois labor unions' abilities in the collective bargaining process. 100
Using the First Amendment as an outcome-oriented tool, the conservative majority validated the six-year attack on public employee
unions and fair-share fee agreements. 10 1
1.

Background

Over forty years ago, the Court first considered the constitutional
question of fair-share agreements1 02 in Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education.10 3 The constitutional challenge to fair-share fees presented in Abood was whether "[r]equiring the payment of [fairshare] fees by nonmember objectors is a violation of the objectors'
First Amendment rights."10 4 The Abood Court agreed that fairshare fees were a violation to a certain extent.

96. Liptak, supra note 12.
97. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2383 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
98. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(citing Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2361).
99. Id.
100. Catherine L. Fisk, Janus: Weaponized First Amendment Shoots at Democracy, AM.
CONST. SOC'Y (July 2, 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/ anus-weaponized-first-amendment-shoots-at-democracy/.
101. Id.
102. Fair-share agreements require non-union members of a collective bargaining agreement to pay their "fair share" of dues to the union in compensation for the benefits they
receive through the collective bargaining process. David Kreutzer & Rachel Greszler, The
Janus Decision Scored a Major Win for Workers' Rights. Here's What Should Come Next.,
DAILY SIGNAL (July 16, 2018), http s://www. dailysignal.com/2 018/O7/16/the-j anus -decisionscored-a-maj or-win-for-workers-rights-heres-what-should-come-next/.
103. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
104. McNicholas et al., supra note 18.

420

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 58

The unanimous Court affirmed that fair-share fees "could be collected from public-sector workers ... [because] any minor infringement ... posed by [fair-share] fees was justified by the state's legitimate interest in preventing free riders from undermining a union's
ability to represent the bargaining unit."10 5 However, the Court
also recognized that the "government may not require an individual
to relinquish rights guaranteed him by the First Amendment as a
condition of public employment." 10 Accordingly, the Court struck
a balance between the competing interests. 107 The Court required
unions to separate out the portion of fair-share fees used "for the
expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to
its duties as collective-bargaining representative." 108
The vast majority of caselaw following Abood primarily focused
on the application of the Court's compromise, adjudicating whether
union expenditures were proper and consistent with Abood's holding, 109 rather than continuing to dispute the constitutionality of the
fees overall.11 0 However, that is not to say the case was without
criticism. Anti-union organizations, which disapproved of the
Court's decision, continued to litigate and challenge fair-share fees
in an effort to weaken union efforts. 1 Such challenges intensified
over the past decade, 112 ultimately leading to the final challenge in
Janus. This final challenge came in light of clear signals from the
11 3
Court that it was ready to reconsider Abood.
The first such signal was found in the Court's decision of Knox v.
SEIU.11 4 The issue in Knox centered around the type of notice a

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235.
109. See, e.g., Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177 (2007); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292
(1986); Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 447 (1984).
110. Joe E. Ling, Note, Transgressionof a Timid Judiciary: Our Highest Court's Refusal
to OverturnAbood v. Board of Education-Harris v. Quinn, 42 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1237,
1245 (2016).
111. McNicholas et al., supra note 18.
112. Knoxv. Serv. Emp. Int'lUnion, Local 1000, 567U.S.298 (2012); Harrisv. Quinn, 134
S.Ct. 2618 (2014); Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass'n, 135 S.Ct. 2933 (2015).
113. McNicholas et al., supra note 18.
114. 567 U.S. 298 (2012).
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union is required to give nonmembers after it levied a special assessment or dues increase.11 5 While Justice Samuel Alito,116 writing for the majority, outlined the controlling precedent regarding
fair-share fees and analyzed the merits of the case, he also added in
his own criticism of the Court's free speech case law.11 7 Specifically,
Justice Alito commented on the free-rider justification first proffered in Abood-the risk of non-union members enjoying a "free
ride" justifies the use of fair-share fees. 11 8 Regarding this argument, he stated in dicta that it "represents something of an anomaly."11 9 It is this statement that "[m]any observers considered...
[as] an invitation to argue for overturning Abood[J" as it evinced
the Court's, or at least Justice Alito's, willingness to reconsider the
120
long-standing precedent's merits.
Two years later, in Harris v. Quinn,12 1 the first corporate-backed
plaintiffs took up Justice Alito's invitation by filing a challenge
against fair-share fees. 122 The case involved Illinois home-care
workers who were nonmember parties to a collective bargaining
unit which contained a fair-share fee agreement. 123 The petitioners,
represented by the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, 124 argued that such agreements violated the employees' First
Amendment rights because the agreements compelled them to pay
125
a fee into a union in which they did not wish to support.
Again, Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion for the Court,
joined by the Court's remaining conservative members. 12 The majority began by noting the lower court's reliance on Abood, in which
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the home-care workers were

115. Id. at 305-06.
116. Justice Alito was appointed by President George W. Bush in 2005 and is "known for
his right wing leanings that sometimes encompass libertarian ideals." Samuel A. Alito,
OYEZ, www.oyez.org/justices/samuel a alito-jr (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
117. Knox, 567 U.S. at 300.
118. The free-rider argument justifies fair-share fees on the premise that such fees "counteract[] the incentive that employees might otherwise have to become free riders'-to refuse
to contribute to the union while obtaining benefits of union representation that necessarily
accrue to all employees." Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977). The same
justification was affirmed in subsequent rulings. See, e.g., Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1
v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
119. Knox, 567 U.S. at 311.
120. McNicholas et al., supra note 18.
121. 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
122. McNicholas et al., supra note 18.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2626.
126. Id. at 2623.
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public employees that fit within the precedent's confines. 127 However, the majority distinguished the home health-care workers from
"full-fledged" public employees because they were only recognized
as public employees for the purposes of collective bargaining. 128 Under the majority's view, this slight distinction removed the case
from analysis under the controlling precedent of Abood. 129 Indeed,
Justice Alito viewed any application of Abood to be a "substantial
130
expansion" of the precedent's reach.
Accordingly, the Court considered whether fair-share fees serve
a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through means
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms[J" in regard
to this special class of employees. 13 1 Ultimately, the Court held that
it did not; thus, such arrangements violated the First Amendment
132
rights of these employees.
However, this holding was limited to the special class of employees at issue, those employees deemed to not be "full-fledged" public
employees. 133 Thus, rather than overruling Abood, the Court
merely held that Abood did not apply in this context. 134 Notably,
Justice Alito again commented on Abood's justifications in dicta,
noting his prior statement in Knox that "Abood is 'something of an
135
anomaly."'
On June 30, 2015, the Court granted certiorari on what seemed
to be the final domino in the chain of cases pushing for the over136
turning of Abood: Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association.
The plaintiff, Rebecca Friedrichs, alongside nine other public school
teachers, directly challenged Abood. 137 The teachers argued that

127. Id. at 2627-28.
128. Id. at 2634 ("Abood involved full-fledged public employees, but in this case, the status
of the personal assistants is much different. The Illinois Legislature has taken pains to specify that personal assistants are public employees for one purpose only: collective bargaining.
For all other purposes, Illinois regards the personal assistants as private-sector employees.").
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. McNicholas et al., supra note 18 (quoting Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2639).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2627 (quoting Knoxv. SEIU, 567 U.S. 298, 311 (2012)).
136. 135 S. Ct. 2933 (2015).
137. The plaintiffs in the case were represented by the Center for Individual Rights (CIR).
Knowing their First Amendment argument had already been answered by the long-standing
precedent of Abood, CIR rushed the case through the lower courts. CIR filed a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, which the union opposed asking for the opportunity to introduce
information on the necessity offair-share fees, which would be the corner stone of the union's
position to uphold Abood. However, the trial court ruled on the pleadings alone, as Abood
clearly controlled, skipping any opportunity to call witnesses, take testimony, and conduct
discovery. The plaintiffs then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed
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being required to make any financial contribution to their unions
through fair-share fee agreements was a violation of their First
Amendment rights. 138 Oral arguments were held on January 11,
2016, and predictions did not fare well for upholding Abood after
their closing. 139 However, due to the unfortunate death of Justice
Scalia on February 13, 2016, the Court was unable to issue a determinative decision, ending the dispute in a 4-4 tie. 140 This "left the
door open [for Governor Bruce Rauner and Mark Janus] to continue
14 1
the attack on [fair-share] fees."
On September 28, 2017, the United States Supreme Court
granted Petitioner, Mark Janus's (hereinafter "Janus") writ of certiorari, 142 which explicitly asked the Court to overrule Abood and
hold public-sector fair-share fee agreements unconstitutional. 143 In
a seven-part opinion, Justice Alito again delivered the majority
opinion of the Court and again was joined by the Court's remaining
conservative members. 144 Justice Elena Kagan, joined by the re145
maining liberal members of the Court, filed a dissenting opinion.

2.

FactualBackground

At first blush, Janus, like much of the Court's recent First
Amendment altering decisions, appeared to be an issue of labor law
the lower decision, again relying on the controlling case of Abood. This allowed the plaintiffs
to petition the United States Supreme Court for review. McNicholas et al., supra note 18.
138. Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass'n, No. SACV 13-676-JLS (CWx), 2013 WL 9825479,
at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013); McNicholas et al., supra note 18.
139. McNicholas et al., supra note 18.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). The initial case against Respondent, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, was
filed by newly elected Illinois State Governor, Bruce Rauner. Lynn Sweet & Jon Seidel, In a
Blow to Unions, Government Workers No Longer Have to Pay Fair Share' Fees, CHI. SUN
TIMES (July 7, 2018, 10:38 AM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/columnists/ruling-mark-j anusafscme-council-3 1-supreme-court-unions-fair-share-fees-collective-bargaining-brucerauner/. Janus, along with Brian Trygg, who was later precluded from bringing his claim
because of his involvement in a prior suit, Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 851 F.3d 746, 748
(7th Cir. 2017), intervened in the Governor's lawsuit after the District Court ruled that
Rauner did not have standing to bring the case. Sweet & Seidel, supra note 142. Janus filed
an amended complaint, claiming that "all 'nonmember fee deductions are coerced political
speech' and that 'the First Amendment forbids coercing any money from the nonmembers."'
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2462. In response, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the basis
that Petitioner's claims were foreclosed by the Court's decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education, which the District Court granted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id.
143. Both Petitioner Janus and intervenor Trygg acknowledged they would not prevail at
the lower courts; however, the process was a necessary step in reaching their ultimate goal
of having agency fee agreements found unconstitutional, which could only be accomplished
at the United States Supreme Court. Janus, 851 F.3d at 747-48.
144. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2459, 2486.
145. Id.at 2487.
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and fair-share fees. But underneath the decision laid the same conservative outcome-oriented application of the First Amendment
seen in Citizens United, Garcetti, and Becerra. The present case,
arising out of Illinois, focused on fair-share fee agreements in the
public sector. At its base, Illinois permits public-sector employees
to unionize under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act
(IPLRA). 14 Under the IPLRA, a union may be designated as the
147
exclusive representative over all employees by a majority vote.
Although employees remain free to refuse union membership, the
union is still charged with the responsibility to represent the interest of all members and nonmembers in the collective bargaining
unit alike. 148 Indeed, regardless of actual membership, a union
works for and provides services to all employees. As decided by
Abood, and contingent on a fair-share fee agreement, nonmembers
were required to pay a reduced fee, excluding any portion of union
149
dues used for political or ideological projects.
The petitioner, Mark Janus, a child support specialist at the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services, was represented by Respondent American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees, Council 31 (hereinafter "Union"), alongside
35,000 other public employees. 150 Because Janus opposed many of
the public policy positions that the Union advocated for, he refused
to join; accordingly, Janus was considered a nonmember party to
his respective bargaining agreement. 151 Indeed, Janus's dissatisfaction was so severe that he opposed having to pay any sum to the
Union for the services he did receive. 152 However, under his unit's
collective bargaining agreement, Janus was nonetheless "required
to pay [a fair-share] fee of $44.58 per month," or $535 per year, pursuant to his union-negotiated contract. 153 In his complaint, Janus
claimed that all nonmember fee deductions, including the $535 he
was required to pay each year, "'are coerced political speech' and
that 'the First Amendment forbids coercing any money from ...
nonmembers."'154

146. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/6(a) (2019) (LEXIS through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
147. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2460-61. Ultimately, agency fees represent a nonmember's "proportionate
share," a reduced percentage of the full dues which accounts for and excludes the proportionate percentage of nonchargeable expenditures. Id. at 2461.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2462.
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The Majority'sAnalysis

The majority opinion, again authored by Justice Alito, and again
joined by the Court's remaining conservative members, started its
analysis by turning to the main issue presented before the Court:
the constitutionality of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.155 To
address this issue, the majority subdivided its analysis of Abood
into three different sections. 156 First, it considered whether Abood's
holding was consistent with First Amendment principles, determining that fair-share fee agreements do raise First Amendment concerns.1 57 Accordingly, in the remaining two subsections, it applied
exacting scrutiny to Abood's two justifications for fair-share feesthe state's interest in labor peace and the risk of free riders, respectively.15 8
Before doing so, the majority briefly recapped First Amendment
protections, noting that the First Amendment forbids abridgement
of the freedom of speech and that freedom of speech "includes both
the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at
all."1 59 The majority concerned itself with the negative right of the
First Amendment to be free of compelled speech.1 0 When speech is
compelled, the majority continued, additional damage is done to the
essential functions that the First Amendment serves because forcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable effectively coerces such individuals into betraying their
convictions, a more urgent concern than simply forcing silence.1 11
While Janus's situation is not exactly compelled speech, the majority noted that forcing a person "to subsidize the speech of other
1 2
private speakers raises similar First Amendment concerns." 3
From this distinction, the majority "recognized that a 'significant
impingement on First Amendment rights' occurs when public employees are required to provide financial support for a union that
'takes many positions during collective bargaining [which] have
powerful political and civic consequences."'16 3 "Because the compelled subsidization of private speech seriously impinges on First
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
United
234-35
163.

Id. at 2463.
Id. at 2463-69.
Id. at 2463-64.
Id. at 2465-69.
Id. at 2463 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)).
Id. at 2464.
Id.
Id. (citing Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 309 (2012); United States v.
Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,
(1977)) (emphasis omitted).
Id. (quoting Knox, 567 U.S. at 310-11).

426;

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 58

Amendment rights," the majority opined that "it cannot be casually
16 4
allowed."
Accordingly, the majority turned to the different "levels of scrutiny" to be applied, which it highlighted through recent free speech
cases. 1 5 Ultimately, it applied intermediate scrutiny, rather than
the more stringent strict scrutiny standard, to evidence that the alleged constitutional infringement at issue could not even pass a
lesser standard of review. 166
Accordingly, the majority turned to the two justifications for fairshare fee agreements accepted in Abood-the state's interest in labor peace and the risk of free riders.16 7 However, it did not find
either of these justifications compelling.16 8 Specifically, it believed
"labor peace" could be achieved through significantly less restrictive
means than fair-share fee agreements.16 9 It supported this contention by recognizing that federal law, the postal service, and twentyeight states all prohibit fair-share fees while sustaining the collective bargaining process. 170 Additionally, the majority opined that
the risk of free riders is never a compelling argument to overcome
a First Amendment challenge.1 71 It believed that simply because
an advocacy group's efforts may benefit nonmembers who are in no
way affiliated with the group itself, with nothing further, does not
mean the advocacy group's speech is to be automatically subsidized
by those who receive some benefit but are otherwise unaffiliated

164. Id.
165. Id. at 2464 (citing Knox, 567 U.S. 298; Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014); Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass'n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (per curiam)). The hierarchical schema
of judicial analysis that the Court uses in First Amendment cases ranges from "strict scrutiny," the most stringent standard, to "intermediate" or "exacting scrutiny," and, finally, to
'minimum scrutiny' or "rational-basis review," the most deferential standard. "Under strict
scrutiny, the state must establish that is has a compelling interest that justifies and necessitates the law in question." Strict Scrutiny, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). "Under 'exacting' scrutiny ... a compelled subsidy must 'serve a compelling state interest that
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms,"
that applies outside of the commercial sphere. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465 (internal citations
omitted). Finally, under minimum scrutiny, "the [C]ourt will uphold a law if it bears a reasonable relationship to the attainment of a legitimate governmental objective." RationalBasis Test, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
166. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465. The majority quickly dismissed the dissent's argument
that the justifications for Abood should be considered under the minimum scrutiny standard,
stating that it was "foreign to... free speech jurisprudence." Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2465-69.
169. The Abood Court defined "labor peace" as, the "avoidance of the conflict and disruption that ... would occur if the employees in a [bargaining] unit were represented by more
than one union." Id. at 2465 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 220-21
(1977)).
170. Id. at 2466.
171. Id.
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with such group. 172 Accordingly, the majority dismissed both argu173
ments.
The majority then considered two main alternative justifications
presented by the Union and its amici curiae. First it considered an
originalist argument-whether Abood was correctly decided because the "First Amendment was not originally understood to provide any protection for the free speech rights of public employees." 174 Next, it considered whether other precedent controlledspecifically, whether Abood is based on Pickering v. Board of Edu175
cation.
The majority dispensed with the originalist argument with little
consideration, noting that it ultimately would result in no free
speech rights of public employees, a consequence the Union could
not have intended. 17 Further, it recognized and considered that
this would render countless precedents meaningless, in direct opposition to the principles of stare decisis. 177 Therefore, the majority
1 78
found the originalist argument unpersuasive.
Next, the majority turned to the justification that Abood was
based on Pickering. However, it quickly responded that it was
not. 179 The majority pointed out that Abood's slight reference of
Pickering-an acknowledgement in a footnote-did not have any
bearing on the issue.18 0 For this reason, the majority viewed this
justification as an unwarranted attempt to fit Abood into the Pickering framework.18 1 Nonetheless, assuming arguendo that Abood
did fit within Pickering's framework, the majority analyzed it as
18 3
such.18 2 Indeed, it determined that Abood would still not survive.

172. Id. (citing Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 311 (2012)). Justice Alito supported this conclusion with a hypothetical. The Justice compared a union's situation to that
of a lobbyist group advocating for senior citizens, veterans, or another group of the like. In
his view, although these types of groups advocate for the benefit of individuals in no way
affiliated with their organization, their advocacy does not grant them a right to compel those
who may directly or indirectly benefit to pay for such speech. Id. at 2466-67.
173. Id. at 2469.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2471 (citing Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
176. Id. at 2469-71.
177. Id. at 2469-70.
178. Id. at 2470-71.
179. Id. at 2471-72.
180. Id. at 2472.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. Under the Pickering framework, the majority first considered (1) whether the
present speech should be treated as speech "pursuant to [an employee's] official duties," (2)
'whether the speech is on a matter of public or only private concern," and (3) "whether the
State's proffered interests justify the heavy burden that agency fees inflict on nonmembers'
First Amendment interests." Id. at 2474-77.
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Notably, within its Pickeringanalysis, the majority believed that
fair-share fee agreements did not constitute speech pursuant to an
employee's official duties-which was the case in Garcetti, discussed supra-becausea contrary holding would distort the reality
of collective bargaining.18 4 In differentiating Garcetti, it noted that
a union member or a nonmember's speech in his or her capacity as
a member or nonmember of the union is substantially different from
that of regular employees, because when a member or nonmember
speaks in his or her regular capacity they speak for the employees,
rather than for the employer.18 5 In the majority's view, this distinction removed the current speech from consideration under Garcetti's standard, meaning that the present speech should not be
18 6
treated as "pursuant to [an employee's] official duties."
Additionally, the majority opined that union speech in collective
bargaining addresses many other important matters of public concern-such as education, child welfare, healthcare, and minority
rights-because the topics of collective bargaining inherently seek
to answer policy questions about such.18 7 Therefore, the majority
determined that speech made pursuant to collective bargaining
"overwhelmingly" consists of "substantial" matters of public con1 88
cern, warranting First Amendment protection.
With all of this considered, the majority concluded that Abood
was improperly decided. Yet it did not simply end its analysis.
Rather, it went on to consider whether the principles of stare decisis
counseled against overruling the longstanding precedent.18 9 At the
outset of this analysis, the majority noted that the doctrine is at its
weakest in the context of constitutional rights. 190 Specifically, it
opined that stare decisis should apply with perhaps the least
amount of force to decisions which wrongly denied First Amendment rights, stating that: "This Court has not hesitated to overrule

184. Id. at 2474.
185. Id.
186. Id. (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)).
187. Id. at 2475-76 ("Take the example of education... [t]he public importance of subsidized union speech is especially apparent in this field, since educators make up by far the
largest category of state and local government employees, and education is typically the largest component of state and local government expenditures. Speech in this area also touches
on fundamental questions of education policy. Should teacher pay be based on seniority, the
better to retain experienced teachers? Or should schools adopt merit-pay systems to encourage teachers to get the best results out of their students?").
188. Id. at 2477.
189. Id. at 2478.
190. Id. (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997)).
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decisions offensive to the First Amendment (a fixed star in our constitutional constellation, if there is one)." 191 Ultimately, after considering the different factors to be taken into account under the doctrine, the majority held that stare decisis did not counsel against
192
overruling Abood.
Justice Alito concluded the roughly twenty-six-page majority
opinion by succinctly stating that Abood was poorly decided and,
therefore, overruled. 193 Accordingly, the majority held that "[s]tates
and public-sector unions may no longer extract [fair-share] fees
from nonconsenting employees." 194 Thus, neither a fair-share fee
"nor any other payment to the union may be deducted from a nonmember's wages, nor may any other attempt be made to collect such
19 5
a payment, unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay."

4.

Dissenting Opinion

Authoring the dissent, 19 Justice Elena Kagan's displeasure with
the majority's ruling is immediately apparent. 197 In her opening,
Justice Kagan comments that "the Court succeed[ed] in its 6-year
campaign to reverse Abood," noting Justice Alito's prior "anomaly"
comments in Knox and Harris. 198 In a rare and animated dissent,
Justice Kagan continued to outline every way the majority went
wrong.
At the forefront, the dissent saw nothing "questionable" about
Abood's analysis. It viewed the free-rider justification to be a substantial concern, quoting the late Justice Scalia, who himself recognized that prohibiting unions from collecting fair-share fees effectively requires it to carry-"to go out of its way to benefit [them],

191. Id. at 2478 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449,
500 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (internal quotation
marks omitted)) (omitting case examples).
192. Id. at 2486 ("All these reasons-that Abood's proponents have abandoned its reasoning, that the precedent has proved unworkable, that it conflicts with other First Amendment
decisions, and that subsequent developments have eroded its underpinnings-provide the
Ispecial justification[s]' for overruling Abood." (citing id. at 2497 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015)))).
193. Id. (reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor joined in Justice Kagan's
dissent. Id. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting). All four justices joining the minority were elected
by Democratic presidents. Sweet & Seidel, supra note 142.
197. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
198. Id. (citing Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass'n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (per curiam); Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014); Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298 (2012)).
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even at the expense of its other interests"-nonmember free-riders. 199 In the dissent's view, the state had a compelling interest to
avoid this problem, justifying any slight infringement that fair20 0
share fees may have imposed.
Additionally, the dissent severely disapproved of the majority's
disregard for the principles of stare decisis. 201 In the dissent's view,
even if Abood was wrong, the principles of stare decisis "demand[ed]
a 'special justification-over and above the belief that the precedent
was wrongly decided."' 202 The dissent found no such special justification in the present case. Ultimately, the dissent seemingly categorized the majority's attempt to curtail the principles of stare decisis to fit its reasoning as laughable, stating it "barely limps to the
20 3
finish line."
The dissent concluded by continuing this severe criticism, more
than implying that the majority's analysis was a partisan decision,
made to pick the "winning side in ... an energetic policy debate. 20 4
However, what was "most alarming" in the dissent's view, was how
the majority chose the case's "winners" by effectively "turning the
First Amendment into a sword, and using it against workaday economic and regulatory policy." 205 The dissent further warned that
this was not the first time, nor would it likely be the last that the
conservative majority had done so. 2 06 Effectively, Justice Kagan
viewed the majority's decision as "weaponizing the First Amendment in a way that unleashes judges, now and in the future, to in20 7
tervene in economic and regulatory policy."

199. Id. at 2490 (quoting Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 556 (1991)).
200. Id. at 2490-91.
201. Id. at 2497 ("But the worse [sic] part of today's opinion is where the majority subverts
all known principles of stare decisis.").
202. Id. (quoting Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015)).
203. Id. at 2501 ("The standard factors this Court considers when deciding to overrule a
decision all cut one way. Abood's legal underpinnings have not eroded over time: Abood is
now, as it was when issued, consistent with this Court's First Amendment law. Abood provided a workable standard for courts to apply. And Abood has generated enormous reliance
interests. The majority has overruled Abood for no exceptional or special reason, but because
it never liked the decision. It has overruled Abood because it wanted to.").
204. Id. ("Americans have debated the pros and cons for many decades-in large part, by
deciding whether to use fair-share arrangements. Yesterday, 22 States were on one side, 28
on the other (ignoring a couple of in-betweenness). Today, that healthy-that democraticdebate ends. The majority has adjudged who should prevail.").
205. Id.
206. Id. at 2501-02 ("Today is not the first time the Court has wielded the First Amendment in such an aggressive way. See, e.g., Nat'l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra,
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (invalidating a law requiring medical and counseling facilities to provide relevant information to users); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (striking
down a law that restricted pharmacies from selling various data).").
207. Id. at 2501.
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III.

A.

ANALYSIS

Defining the "Weaponization of the FirstAmendment"

The Court sparked much debate following its decision in Janus.
While the Left criticized the Court's analysis and reasoning, the
Right justified the Court's decision, viewing it as a long-time coming. 208 However, both sides agree that Janus's ruling is a "blow to
20 9
[labor] unions."
Much of the criticism understandably comes from the Left, which
views "Janus [as] an ideological attack on workplace and political
democracy." 2 10 But this criticism amounts to more than just a policy
debate decided under a certain ideological view; rather, it rises to
the view of an all-out political attack by wealthy corporate interests
on the labor movement. 211 A majority of such criticism considers
the United States Supreme Court, specifically the conservative majority, as a vital part in such assault, implying that the Court no
longer plays the role of an independent judiciary but rather that of
an active participant. 21 2 This is evidenced in a few different ways.
To start, the Court has had a higher tendency to take and decide
conservative free speech cases. 21 3 Statistically, the Roberts Court
has heard far more conservative free speech cases than that of its
predecessors. 21 4 Additionally, the Roberts Court has also decided in
favor of conservative free speech in those cases more often than it
has decided in favor of liberal free speech in such cases. 215 These
statistics seemingly speak for themselves; the Court has been more
willing to decide in favor of its majority's political ideology.
This trend undoubtedly substantiates the Court's natural willingness to hear Janus in the first place, as it concerned conservative
speech-animus towards the labor movement. However, Justice
Alito's "anomaly" statements likely played a significant role in light

208. See generally Jordan Muller, Here's Why the Supreme Court's 'Right-to-Work"Ruling
Is a Win for Conservatives, OPENSECRETS.ORG (June 27, 2018, 10:03 AM), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/20 18/06/j anus-vs-afscme-ruling-impact-conservatives/; Fisk, supra note
100.
209. Sweet & Seidel, supra note 142.
210. Fisk, supra note 100.
211. Spielman et al., supra note 20.
212. Fisk, supra note 100.
213. Specifically, it has taken a 65% share of free speech cases concerning conservative
speech, which is a 23% increase from the Rehnquist Court and a 57% increase from the Warren Court. Liptak, supra note 12.
214. Id.
215. The Roberts Court has ruled in favor of conservative free speech in 69% of such cases
it has taken, while only ruling in favor of liberal speech in 21% of such cases. Id.
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of this trend.2 16 Anti-union organizations certainly embraced this
message with open arms, as they had "picked at the seams of Abood
for decades in an attempt to weaken the ability of unions to collect
fair-share fees." 2 17 Indeed, such challenges gained a new momentum in light of the increasingly corporate-friendly United States Supreme Court, 21 8 prompting the eventual challenges to Abood's constitutionality by the corporate-backed plaintiffs of both Friedrichs
and Janus.21 9 Thus, the corporate-friendly feel of the United States
Supreme Court, supplemented by the deep pockets of corporate interests, created the perfect storm for Janus to be brought, heard,
and overruled. Yet these statistics alone are not necessarily proof
that the conservative majority on the Court has used the First
Amendment to its advantage. Nonetheless, other recent trends, or
the lack thereof, regarding the Court's stance on free speech seemingly offer additional proof.
First, the Court has not only broadened free speech rights when
necessary to serve conservative speech but has also narrowed free

speech rights when necessary to do

So.

2 20

Indeed, the Court has

lacked a sense of consistency in applying free speech principles.
This lack of consistency evinces an intent to favor conservative free
speech, rather than merely a specific ideological stance. 221 Two
cases previously discussed-Garcettiand Citizens United-beginto
222
illustrate this point.
In Garcetti, the Court made an unprecedented distinction between the speech of citizens and that of public employees. 223 This
distinction effectively narrowed free speech rights and resulted in
an enormous loss of rights for millions of public employees. 224 However, in Citizens United, the Court overruled long-standing precedent to grant corporations the First Amendment right to spend
money in election campaigns. 225 Indeed, this decision expanded free
speech protections to favor corporate speech. 226 The stark contrast
216.

McNicholas, supra note 18.

217.

Id.

218. Liptak, supra note 12.
219. "The plaintiffs in Harris,Friedrichs,and Janushave all been represented by wealthy
legal foundations, providing pro bono representation in each of these cases." McNicholas et
al., supra note 18.
220.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 169.

221. Id.
222. Id. at 194-98.
223. Id. at 195.
224. Id. at 194.
225. Id. at 197.
226. Id. The decision was a drastic change from the Court's view seven years previously
under Rehnquist. One easily identifiable change was Court personnel. Justice Alito replaced
Justice O'Connor, previously in the majority against Citizens United's view of free speech,
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between the application of free speech principles in these two cases,
made roughly four years apart by the same conservative members
on the Court, evince the Court's willingness to construe free speech
principles in favor of conservative speech. While these two cases
implicated different areas of free speech methodology, this inconsistent application can be seen in other comparable decisions, including Janus.
For example, in Harris,the Court's application of Abood narrowly
tailored free speech principles to find fair-share fees unconstitutional against a select group of individuals. 227 Again, Harris dealt
with what the majority in that case considered a partial-public employee, or employees that were only considered public employees for
the sake of collective bargaining. 228 Thus, while these employees
were indeed covered under the collective bargaining contract and
declared public employees by Illinois law, the majority distinguished them nonetheless, removing them from consideration under the controlling precedent of Abood. 229 This distinction was
enough for the majority to refrain from, as it considered, substan230
tially expanding Abood's holding to govern the present case.
However, such distinction truly should not have made a difference
in Abood's application. 231 Ultimately, the conservative majority
again narrowed free speech principles, limiting Abood's application
232
in pursuit of finding fair-share fees unconstitutional.
Further, the majority's decision in Janus seemingly narrows free
speech as well; however, it does so through the use of its holdings
in Pickering and Garcetti. 233 First, the majority quickly dismisses
any application of the Pickeringframework to Abood, 234 choosing to
strictly apply its analysis without regard to the general principles
that may be derived and applied in the case at bar. 235 Specifically,
in the public employment context, the government has a much freer
hand in regulating its employees' speech, as opposed to the general
public. 23 In the employment realm, the government's managerial
and effectively tipped the balance of the Court in favor of overturning the prior precedent.

Id.
227. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2634 (2014).
228. Id. at 2625, 2634.
229. Id. at 2634.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 2646 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
232. See generally id. at 2645-58 (explaining how the conservative majority distinguished
the factual circumstances to remove the case from the controlling precedent of Abood, while
remaining reluctant to overrule the precedent).
233. See Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2471-78 (2018).
234. Id. at 2472.
235. Id. at 2494 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 2492.
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interest-the need to run the government as effectively and efficiently as possible-necessitates its need to manage its workforce
as it sees fit. Thus, public employees submit to certain limitations
on their speech by the very nature of their employment. 237 A proper
balance must, therefore, be achieved when public employees' expressive rights are at issue, between employee speech rights and
the government's managerial prerogative. 238 The Court has long
utilized Pickeringin striking such balance. 239 Nonetheless, the majority takes a strict and narrow view of Pickering's application, ignoring that both Pickering and Abood utilize this underlying principle.240

Further, although the majority argued that Garcetti's principles
did not apply, 24 1 Garcetti held that if an employee's speech is made
pursuant to his or her employment duties, it is largely unprotected. 242 Accordingly, under Garcetti, if an employee speaks on a
workplace matter, he or she has no opportunity to bring a First
Amendment claim. 24 3 While the dissent recognized this underlying
principle of Garcetti-thatspeech in the scope of employment is unprotected until it extends into the public realm 244-the majority further narrowed its application in Janus, restricting it to only when
an employee speaks pursuant to his or her official duties or otherwise speaks as his or her employer. 245 Thus, the majority's reasoning in Janus must be looked at in one of two different ways in regard
to Garcetti: (1) the majority narrowed Garcetti'sholding further, removing its application from the current case, or (2) the majority
narrowly decided Janus, carving out a "unions only" exception. 24
Otherwise, the two opinions contradict.
To express this contradiction, take the underlying complaint in
Garcetti. Ceballos's speech claim stemmed from a memorandum
written to his supervisors expressing his concerns regarding an employment matter. 24 7 In determining whether Ceballos's speech was
protected, the dispositive factor was not that his speech was made

237. Id. at 2492.
238. Id. at 2493.
239. Id.
240. Id. ("Like Pickering, Abood drew the constitutional line by analyzing the connection
between the government's managerial interests and different kinds of expression.").
241. Id. at 2474 (majority opinion).
242. Id. at 2471 (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421-22 (2006)).
243. Id. at 2492 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
244. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 436 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
245. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474.
246. Id. at 2496 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
247. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414.
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at work or about his employment-although those factors are significant-but rather that his speech was made pursuant to his duties as a public employee. 248 The speech was about and directed to
the workplace, rather than the broader public square. 249 This is the
critical question. Accordingly, had Ceballos directed his memorandum to the local news outlet, rather than his supervisor, his speech
would be protected. 250 Consider a similar situation in which a public employee is subpoenaed to testify in court as to the criminal acts
of his supervisor. In that situation, the employee speaks not as a
public employee-although his speech undoubtedly arises out of his
employment relationship-but rather as a private citizen because
the speech is not made within the ordinary scope of an employee's
251
duties, regardless of whether the speech concerns such duties.
Accordingly, when it comes to the type of speech at issue in Abood
and Janus, it should be seen as speech made within the ordinary
scope of an employee's duties. As the dissent points out, the "essential stuff' of collective bargaining should be given the same treatment. 252 While individualized cases are easily distinguished,
speech that owes itself to the collective bargaining process should
be treated in the same manner because such speech is truly of the
workplace or occurs because of the employment relationship. It is
speech addressed to the workplace, made in the workplace, and
(most of all) about the workplace. 2 53 This is the important question.
Nonetheless, the majority equated such speech as being directed
to the public sphere because of potential budgetary consequences in
one portion of its analysis. 2 54 It further qualified the union's speech
on behalf of employees as speech made for the employees, not the
employer, in another. Both views take the speech at issue out of
Garcetti's control, causing the speech to fail at either the first or
second step of the Pickering analysis. Thus, Janus can be viewed
as narrowing Garcetti's reach by requiring speech made pursuant
to one's employment duties to be speech made on behalf of his or
her employer, or as a limited decision, expressing a union's only exception in which the very nature of collective bargaining justifies
excluding this speech from protection. The contrast between Janus

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at 421.
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2471.
See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423-24.
See Lane v.Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 239-40 (2014).
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2494-96 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2495.
Id. at 2495-96.
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and Garcetti-andconsequently Pickering-againevinces the conservative majority's willingness to limit free speech principles when
255
it serves their agenda to do so.
Finally, the conservative majority on the Court again broadened
free speech protections in Becerra.2 56 The dissent in Becerra makes
clear that the case's majority extended sound First Amendment
principles far beyond the limits it should have. 2 57 Indeed, the majority applied such goals as "the need to protect the Nation from
laws that 'suppress unpopular ideas or information' or inhibit the
,marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail[,J'" beyond its own careful examination of how such goals should be fulfilled. 258 Ultimately, the dissent condemned the majority's broad
use of the First Amendment to "strike down economic and social
laws that legislatures long would have thought themselves free to
enact." 259 In short, each of these cases discussed evidences that the
conservative Court has curtailed First Amendment principles to
26 0
produce a specific outcome in line with the ideologies of the Right.
Notable in Justice Kagan's dissent were both the majority's decision of First Amendment principles and its utter disregard for all
known principles of stare decisis. "Stare decisis has a long pedigree
in the American legal tradition." 2 1 Often emphasized by the Court,
stare decisis plays a critical role in ensuring that legal rules remain
consistent and stable under the constant pressures of changing
times and circumstances. 23 2 Indeed, Justice Kagan herself stresses
that "[d]epartures from stare decisis are supposed to be 'exceptional
action[s]' demanding 'special justification."' 2 3 "Tellingly, in a substantial majority of cases over the past 50 years in which a constitutional precedent has been overturned, the [C]ourt has been unanimous or nearly unanimous, with two or fewer justices in dissent."2 4 It follows that unanimity is seen as a reflection of the
Court's decision being "founded in law rather than the proclivities
2 5
of individuals" and its integrity as the independent judiciary. 6
255.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 197.

256.
257.
258.
259.

Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
Id. at 2382 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2383.

260.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 194.

261. Michael Kimberly, Symposium: The Importance of Respecting Precedent,
SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 20, 2017, 2:57 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/12/symposium-importance-respecting-precedent/.
262. Id.
263. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
264. Kimberly, supra note 261.
265. Id. (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986)).
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Accordingly, overruling long-standing constitutional precedent,
as the majority does in Janus, by a strongly divided Court "raises
doubts . . .about whether it is principles or politics that underlie

the [C]ourt's decisions." 23 Justice Kagan implied the latter when
she stated that the conservative majority accomplished such ideo27
logical goals "by weaponizing the First Amendment," in Janus.
She further warned that Janus had not been the first of such im2 8
proper action, nor will it be the last.
Such a warning seemingly stems not only from the trend of
caselaw Justice Kagan refers to, but also from a potentially overlooked statement from the majority. 26 9 One justification for the majority's departure from stare decisis is that the doctrine is "at its
weakest" in interpreting constitutional provisions, implying that
constitutional rights themselves warrant the special justification
Justice Kagan's dissent considers lacking. 270 The Court goes on to
clarify that "stare decisis applies with perhaps least force of all to
decisions that wrongly denied First Amendment rights." 271 On its
face, this statement seems warranted to an extent. However, its potential use is exactly what the dissent warns of.
One of the dissent's many criticisms of the Court helps to illustrate this statement's potential. Justice Kagan criticized the majority, stating: "[d]on't like a decision? Just throw some gratuitous
criticisms into a couple of opinions and a few years later point to
them as 'special justifications."' 272 She was, of course, referring to
Justice Alito's comments in Knox and Harris, stating that Janus
was somewhat of an anomaly. 273 The majority, written by Justice
Alito, relied on such comments, also written by Justice Alito, in justifying its decision to overturn Abood.274 The conflict with this situation is blatantly obvious.
In fact, the majority's analysis of Abood's constitutionality begins
with a recap of the Justice's past criticism. 275 Justice Alito opens
by saying:

266. Id.
267. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 2501-02.
270. Id. at 2478 (majority opinion) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997)).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 2498 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
273. Knox v.SEIU, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2290 (2012); Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct.
2618, 2627 (2014).
274. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2463.
275. Id. at 2463.
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In Abood, the Court upheld the constitutionality of an agencyshop arrangement like the one now before us, but in more recent cases we have recognized that this holding is "something
of an anomaly," and that Abood's "analysis is questionable on
several grounds." We have therefore refused to extend Abood
to situations where it does not squarely control, while leaving
for another day the question whether Abood should be over276
ruled.
He sets the stage for Abood's reversal as if he is referring to longstanding precedent, rather than his own dicta. Thus, there seems
to be an inherent bias in the Justice's reasoning as he ends the campaign to overrule Abood, a campaign his words started a few years
277
ago.
If the conservative majority used its own dicta to initiate the assault on Abood, what should stop it from using such a statement to
overrule precedent in favor of conservative speech in the future?
While this may be speculation, the recent trend of the Court certainly does not foreclose the argument, just as the dissent suggests.
B.

PotentialImplications of Janus and the FirstAmendment

Along with her issued warning at the end of her nearly fifteenpage dissent, Justice Kagan references that speech is everywhere,
a part of every human activity, such as employment, health care,
and securities trading, among other things. 2 78 As such, the conservative majority's use of the First Amendment seemingly has no
end because all economic or regulatory policies that touch such
speech are seemingly put in the cross hairs after the Janus's ruling. 2 79
Consider the minimum wage for example. The federal minimum
wage rests at $7.25 per hour as set by the Fair Labor Standards
Act.280 As the "fight for $15," currently continues across America,
successful First Amendment challenges, backed by similarly-sponsored corporate-backed organizations, to a state's minimum wage
laws may be forthcoming. 28 1 Indeed, such claims have already

276. Id. (internal citations omitted).
277. Id. at 2498 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("Dicta in those recent decisions indeed began the
assault on Abood that has culminated today.").
278. Id. at 2501-02.
279. Id.
280. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012, Supp. I, Supp. II, Supp. III, Supp. IV & Supp. V).
281. See generally Braden Campbell, Wages up $61.5B for 19M Through Fight for $15,
Report Says, LAW360 (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/867320/wages-up-61-
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made their way to the courtroom but to no avail at this point. 282 The
laws were viewed as purely economic regulations with the only impingement upon one's First Amendment rights being insufficient to
283
trigger scrutiny.
However, the minimum wage is another energetic policy debate. 284 While federal law sets the baseline, each state is free to
enact a higher rate. Further, cities may enact local ordinances raising the minimum wage above the federal limit.285 Nonetheless, employers are ultimately able to set the hourly wages for their employees greater than or equal to this set minimum wage. Generally,
employers set these wages according to an employee's value, or
what that employee's labor is "worth." However, what exactly one's
labor is worth or how that worth is to be determined is one issue at
the core of the minimum wage debate. 28 Thus, where a state or
local ordinance has enacted a drastic increase to the minimum
wage, most employers will be required by law to pay their employees more than they generally view their work to be worth.
Accordingly, in line with the Janus majority, such a drastic increase may be argued as compelling employers to overvalue the
work of their employee's labor. This is especially true in light of the
heated policy debate. If a similar argument is accepted, it may be
enough to thrust a minimum wage law from being generally seen
as a purely economic regulation, to being seen as implicating one's
First Amendment rights to the point of triggering some level of
scrutiny. As Justice Kagan's dissent makes clear, such a challenge
is not out of the purview of the conservative majority.287

5b-for- 19m-through-fight-for- 15-report-says (describing the worker advocacy campaign, comprised of a majority of fast-food restaurant chain employees, to increase the minimum wage
for workers).
282. See Int'l Franchise Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1256 (W.D. Wash.
2015), aff'd in relevant part, 803 F.3d 389 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1838 (2016).
283. See Int'l FranchiseAssn, Inc., 803 F.3d at 408.
284. See generally Alison Doyle, Pros and Cons of Raising the Minimum Wage, BALANCE
CAREERS, https://www.thebalancecareers.com/pros-and-cons-of-raising-the-minimum-wage2062521 (last updated July 15, 2019).
285. Erica Bergmann, Note, Three out of Four EconomistsRecommend Raising the Minimum Wage! A Closer Look at the Debate Surrounding Seattle's Minimum Wage Ordinance,
39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 593, 594.

286. See generally Jenn Brown, Trying to Understandthe Value of Work: Why Do We Pay
So Little for Labor that We Depend on So Much?, NOTEWORTHY-THE J. BLOG (May 30, 2019),
https://blog.usej ournal.com/trying-to-understand-the-value-of-work-why-do-we-pay-so-littlefor-labor-that-we-depend-on-so-9b760a53d33d.
287. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501-02 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissent-
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CONCLUSION

In short, it is no secret that the liberal-conservative divide over
free speech has intensified over the past few decades. This divide
is significantly present on the conservative side of the Court, as recent case law evidences the conservative majority's use of the First
Amendment as an outcome-oriented tool to achieve a certain
agenda. It is this use of free speech principles that makes Justice
Kagan's dissenting remarks correct, that truly today's Court has
gone further than its predecessors and effectively weaponized the
First Amendment. While its fate is still fairly unknown, there is
certainly some truth behind Justice Kagan's warning that the conservative majority's road runs long. Indeed, the First Amendment
was meant for better things.

